What happens with specific details of laws?
Continuation of Chapter Two of “Brit Shalom”.
We are discussing foundational principles. Now, in the seventh principle, we ask ourselves what happens with specific details of laws.
For example, when discussing the prohibition of grafting – not grafting a fruit of one species onto a tree of another species – the question arises: how do we define two species? In Jewish law, there are very precise definitions of what constitutes two distinct species. For instance, the lemon tree and the etrog (citron) tree, although both from the citrus family, are considered two distinct species and may not be grafted together. Is this prohibition also relevant to Noahides, or should the definition of species be determined by the sages of other nations?
On this matter, there is a difference of opinion among the sages of Israel. Some hold that any details of Noahide laws not explicitly mentioned in the Talmud or by halakhic authorities should be approached according to Jewish law. For example, in the laws of theft, it would be necessary to study the entire halakhic literature of Israel. Others believe that it is the responsibility of Noahide sages to establish definitions based on their own reasoning.
Therefore, Noahides should not be burdened with statements like, “this graft is forbidden,” or, “according to Jewish law, this is theft.” Instead, there exists human reasoning and legislation that does not have to match Jewish law. This second opinion is, indeed, the primary one. This last view is considered authoritative in halakha.
